Are you willing to be made nothing? Is Commonwealth reform possible? by Baert, Francis & Shaw, Timothy M
Are you willing to be made nothing?
Is Commonwealth reform possible?
FRANCIS BAERT AND TIMOTHY M. SHAW*
International Affairs 90: 5 (2014) 1143–1160
© 2014 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2014 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published by John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford ox4 2dq, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
Are you willing to be sponged out, erased, cancelled, 
made nothing? 
Are you willing to be made nothing? 
dipped into oblivion? 
If not, you will never really change.1
The above passage is from ‘Phoenix’, one of the last poems of D. H. Lawrence. 
Like the firebird, international organizations seem never, or rarely, to die, as 
Susan Strange has provocatively argued.2 The British empire is long gone, but 
out of its ashes grew the Commonwealth, a somewhat awkward, idiosyncratic 
network. It is no surprise, then, that most analyses of the Commonwealth consist 
of existential musings: for whom and for what purpose does it exist? Its telos is 
elusive, even for the most ardent followers, such as James Mayall: ‘I think of the 
modern Commonwealth as a happy accident. If it did not exist it would neither 
be necessary nor perhaps possible to invent it.’3 Hedley Bull’s comment in the 
middle of the last century is telling: ‘Too close an inspection might serve only to 
explode the “myth” of the Commonwealth and accelerate its continuous progress 
of disintegration’.4 If a recent poll is to be believed, most British people have no 
idea about the purpose or policies of the Commonwealth: in a survey of 100 senior 
United Kingdom decision-makers from media, politics and the civil service, only 
25 per cent of respondents correctly identified the Commonwealth when its activ-
ities were described.5 
*  We would like to thank Stephen Kingah, Christopher L. Lock, Léonie Maes, Luk Van Langenhove and 
Marieke Zwartjes for valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 D. H. Lawrence, ‘Phoenix’, in The complete poems of D. H. Lawrence (London: Wordsworth Editions, 1994), p. 
614. The phoenix can represent many aspects of human life, including empire. See R. Van den Broek, The 
myth of the phoenix, according to classical and early Christian tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1972), p. 9.
2 Susan Strange, ‘Why do international organizations never die?’, in Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek, eds, 
Autonomous policy making by international organizations (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 213–20.
3 James Mayall, ‘Introduction’, in James Mayall, ed., The contemporary Commonwealth: an assessment 1965–2009 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p. 3. Even the very identity of the Commonwealth as an international organiza-
tion has been the topic of debate: see William Dale, ‘Is the Commonwealth an international organisation?’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 31: 3, 1982, pp. 451–73.
4 Hedley Bull, ‘What is the Commonwealth?’, World Politics 11: 4, 1959, pp. 577–87.
5 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The role and future of the Commonwealth. Fourth Report of Session 
2012–13 (London: The Stationery Office, 2012), p. 24, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/
cmselect/cmfaff/114/114.pdf, accessed 14 July 2014.
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For the Commonwealth, unknown and increasingly unloved, every misstep is 
the beginning of a new episode of existential quandary. The year 2013 was a deep 
low in its recent history. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) in Colombo was overshadowed by controversies about the bad human 
rights record of the host country, Sri Lanka, which resulted in the absence of 
many important heads of state and a concluding communiqué which could not 
expunge the diplomatic fiasco. If not the first, it was certainly the most controver-
sial CHOGM, with the host accused of human rights violations by the highest UN 
human rights authorities. Now that the circus has left Colombo, it is time to pick 
up the broken pieces. The year 2014 may be a more joyful one for the Common-
wealth family, in particular given the sportive cheers (and tears) that the Glasgow 
Commonwealth Games will bring, but the aftertaste of the last CHOGM is very 
bitter. This year of 2014, then, should serve as a period of contemplation leading 
up to the important year that follows: for 2015 represents a symbolic turning point 
for the Commonwealth Secretariat, marking the half-century since its creation in 
1965. 
Since the end of the Cold War and the return to membership of South Africa in 
late 1995, the organization has been seeking a new vocation. Many reform proposals 
have been made. These have not led to much change, and may increasingly cause 
‘reform fatigue’, a phenomenon encountered in the history of many classic inter-
national organizations. More importantly, they may lead to a further marginaliza-
tion of the organization in the present century as the number of the world’s states, 
and of the issues that preoccupy them, continues to grow. Resources are scarce, 
especially those available for dealing with international affairs, human develop-
ment and global public goods since the decline of the Washington Consensus. 
Furthermore, there has been a proliferation of agencies advancing novel forms 
of ‘global governance’ and rule-making involving increasing roles for the private 
sector, civil society, transnational advocacy groups, partnerships and networks.6 
So should we even bother about the Commonwealth?
The Commonwealth has much to contribute to the development of this new, 
more diffuse and highly complex picture of global governance. With its postwar 
membership consistently weighted towards developing countries, it is well situ-
ated to capture energy from the seemingly unstoppable process of global rebal-
ancing. For example, with India and South Africa in its ranks, it includes two of 
the five BRICS as well as a quarter of the G20 (Australia, Canada, India, South 
Africa and the UK). In the current decade, Africa is growing as fast as Asia; most 
Commonwealth members are situated in these two ‘Southern’ continents, so can 
the Commonwealth usefully contribute to the post-2015 world of development?7
In our view, current debates around Commonwealth reform miss the point. 
As the world evolves in response to financial crises and economic rebalancing, no 
single international organization can be hegemonic: they all need to network with 
6 Andrew Hurrell, On global order: power, values, and the constitution of international society (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007), p. 6; see also esp. ch. 4.
7 Anthony Payne, ‘How many Gs are there in “global governance” after the crisis? The perspectives of the 
“marginal majority” of the world states’, International Affairs 86: 3, May 2010, pp. 729–40.
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a range of inter- and non-governmental global and local organizations in hybrid 
coalitions. Many proposals for reform have been introduced during the past 20 years 
but most of them have evaporated. In this article we try to understand why this 
has happened, and to offer some ideas on how to overcome this desultory legacy. 
The Commonwealth’s strongest claim is to privilege its third, informal, non-state 
dimension, identified below as the centrepiece of Commonwealth Plus networks.
The silent road of reform
The latest round of reform proposals started at the Port of Spain CHOGM in 2009, 
which established an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) under the chairmanship of 
former Prime Minister of Malaysia Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Between July 
2010 and July 2011 the EPG held five meetings and received around 300 written 
submissions from various Commonwealth organizations, Commonwealth Secre-
tariat staff, Commonwealth commentators and the attentive public. Its reform 
proposals were contained in A Commonwealth of the people: time for urgent reform.8 This 
EPG report consisted of no fewer than 106 recommendations. Among the most 
heatedly discussed were the proposals for the adoption of a Commonwealth Char-
ter and the establishment of a Commonwealth Commissioner for Democracy, the 
Rule of Law and Human Rights. Although keenly anticipated, the Charter adopted 
at the beginning of 2013 only reaffirms existing non-binding declarations. The 
Commonwealth Commissioner is not being introduced, as this was a bridge too 
far for many member governments, especially those in the global South. 
Although thoughtful and timely, the report of the EPG made the same mistake 
as most other reform proposals within such a diverse multilateral setting. Despite 
consulting a wide variety of stakeholders and interested partners, the reform 
proposals do not consider concrete measures to sharpen the organization’s profile, 
downsize, or refocus the scope and size of its activities. Reform should be more 
than a diplomatic act, making sure that no single input is neglected and that none 
of the interested parties feels alienated from the process; it should make the organi-
zation function better. Most of the time, the main message that emerges is that the 
organization should do more, but within the same staff and budgetary constraints. 
One could call this the ‘paradox of reform’. A lot of diplomacy, less management.
A Commonwealth of the people does not make many strategic choices on which 
issues to cover. One of the major problems with today’s intergovernmental 
Commonwealth is that it tackles almost all aspects of international affairs—almost 
like a mini-UN—but without the necessary mandate, toolbox, human resources 
or financial capacity. In short, the Commonwealth—or Commonwealths, given 
the existence of both interstate and non-state forms—needs to network with 
compatible mixed actor coalitions, sometimes as leader, often as follower, and we 
increasingly observe it to be a follower.
8 Commonwealth Secretariat, A Commonwealth of the people: time for urgent reform. The report of the Eminent Persons 
Group to Commonwealth Heads of Government (Perth, October 2011), http://www.sirronaldsanders.com/Docs/
EPG%20Report%20FINALprintedVersion.pdf, accessed 22 July 2014.
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For many the Commonwealth is a champion of the global South, especially 
small island developing states (SIDS).9 Other recurring themes are the promotion 
of human rights and democracy, and the management of economic globaliza-
tion.10 A glance at the website of the Commonwealth Secretariat shows activities 
in at least a dozen fields from democracy promotion to engagement with youth. 
Does this extensive range of activities reflect the motives for members’ participa-
tion? Does it make an impact? Such questions deserve further investigation and 
should inform discourses around global governance. But in order to conduct any 
such investigation we need first to dissect our object of study.
A strange animal
Unlike almost all other international organizations, the Commonwealth consists 
of a wide variety of different organs and bodies, commonly referred to collec-
tively as the ‘Commonwealth family’. Since 1971 the Commonwealth itself has 
stuck with the definition contained in the Singapore Declaration of Common-
wealth Principles and reaffirmed in the newly adopted Charter: ‘a voluntary 
association of independent states and equal sovereign states, each responsible for 
its own policies, consulting and co-operating in the common interests of our 
peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace, 
and influencing international society to the benefit of all through the pursuit of 
common principles and values’. The voluntary character of the organization is 
lauded by many. Without this, the Commonwealth might not have survived for 
so long after the demise of the British empire. For political pragmatists it is also 
rather comfortable to be part of an organization that causes few waves and has 
minimal authority. How many members would have signed a binding Charter? 
As the spokesperson of the Nigerian Senate, Senator Enyinnaya Abaribe, recently 
stated: ‘I am not aware that the Commonwealth of Nations is making laws for 
Nigeria. Nigeria, as a Federal Republic, is an independent country. Our associa-
tion with the Commonwealth of Nations is voluntary. The fact the Common-
wealth of Nations makes any law or signs any charter does not necessarily mean 
that we must accept such.’11 Even so, occasionally countries are suspended, 
although this entails few risks or transaction costs. This is reflected in Pakistan’s 
‘membership flip flop’. The country left the organization in 1972, rejoined in 1989, 
was suspended in 1999—a ban which was lifted in 2004—suspended again in 2007, 
and readmitted again in 2008.
9 Ronald Sanders, ‘The Commonwealth as a champion of small states’, in Mayall, ed., The contemporary Common-
wealth, pp. 83–102. The SIDS also formed their own Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) group, which 
comprises 44 of the world’s small island states, and is one of the strongest defenders of binding rules regarding 
greenhouse gas reductions. So, aside from the Commonwealth, SIDS found it necessary to have their own 
advocacy group.
10 Timothy M. Shaw, Commonwealth: inter- and non-state contributions to global governance (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2008).
11 Pursa Sen, ‘Commonwealth Charter is a fig leaf that will change little for LGBT people’, Open Democracy, 27 
March 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/purna-sen/commonwealth-charter-is-fig-leaf-that-will-change- 
little-for-lgbt-people, accessed 14 July 2014.
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In our quest to understand the Commonwealth, we found a useful frame-
work in the innovative work of the United Nations Intellectual History Project 
(UNIHP).12 Traditionally, many analysts of the UN use Inis Claude’s classic 
distinction between the UN as an intergovernmental arena of member states (a 
club of states) and as a secretariat (a bureaucracy led by the UN secretary general).13 
The UNIHP proposed to move beyond this by adding a ‘third UN’ to the analyt-
ical framework. This ‘additional’ UN consists of NGOs, academics, consultants, 
experts, independent commissions and other groups of organized individuals 
in civil society that routinely engage with the first and second UNs. The third 
UN’s role includes advocacy, research, policy analysis and idea-mongering, and 
is a reflection of the growing complexity of global issues and resultant global 
governance structures; it embodies the conception of ‘multiple multilateralisms’.14 
Adopting such a scheme to explain the Commonwealth enables us to see more 
clearly some of its mysteries and limitations.
The ‘first Commonwealth’ (the ‘official Commonwealth’), then, is an inter-
governmental organization of 53 states covering one-third of the world’s popula-
tion.15 Its members are located in a wide range of regions: Africa (18), Asia (8), the 
Americas (3), the Caribbean (10), Europe (3) and the South Pacific (11). Reflecting 
its origin as a successor to the former British empire, almost all of its members 
are former colonies. The modern Commonwealth took shape through the 1949 
London Declaration which facilitated India’s membership as a republic. All the 
member states, except for Mozambique and Rwanda, have experienced direct or 
indirect British rule. Originally a group of just eight countries, nowadays the 
Commonwealth includes a quarter of UN member states and a wide range of 
polities, differing widely in size, development, geography, hard or soft power, 
culture, religion and other aspects. Every two years this group of states meets for 
discussion at the CHOGM, around which non-state forums also gather. The next 
such meeting is scheduled to take place in Malta in 2015 (it was originally planned 
for Mauritius, but moved owing to that country’s boycott of the Colombo 
meeting: it is traditional that the head of state of the new CHOGM host country 
should be present at the preceding meeting). 
Members are represented in several bodies of the organization, the most 
important of which is the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), 
12 Francis Baert, ‘The United Nations Intellectual History Project and the role of ideas’, in Bob Reinalda, ed., 
The Ashgate research companion to non-state actors (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).
13 Inis L. Claude Jr, Swords into plowshares: the problems and prospects of international organization (New York: Random 
House, 1956).
14 Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis and Richard Jolly, ‘The “third” United Nations’, Global Governance 15: 
1, 2009, pp. 123–42.
15 Fiji is currently suspended, Gambia left voluntarily in 2013 and Zimbabwe forsook the organization in 2003 
under huge pressure. The 53 current member states are: Antigua and Barbuda,* Australia,* Bahamas,* Bang-
ladesh, Barbados,* Belize,* Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada,* Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, 
Ghana, Grenada,* Guyana, India, Jamaica,* Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand,* Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,* St Kitts 
and Nevis,* St Lucia,* St Vincent and the Grenadines,* Rwanda, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
Solomon Islands,* South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu,* 
Uganda, United Kingdom,* Vanuatu and Zambia. Members marked with a * are Commonwealth realms, in 
which the British monarch is head of state.
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established in 1995 to deal with serious or persistent violations of the Common-
wealth’s fundamental values. The Group is convened by the secretary general and 
is composed of the foreign ministers of nine Commonwealth member countries, 
supplemented as appropriate by one or two additional ministerial representa-
tives from the region concerned. Member states are diplomatically represented in 
London through the system of high commissioners.16 Over time, their leisurely 
reflections at 10 Downing Street and then Marlborough House in London, 
including weekend retreats at the government’s country houses of Chequers and 
Dorneywood, became more compressed and less elegant.17 
This first Commonwealth group of 53 states has delegated some authority to 
three bureaucracies that jointly form the ‘second Commonwealth’ (the ‘Common-
wealth bureaucracy’): the Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Founda-
tion and the Commonwealth of Learning. Kamalesh Sharma of India, the fifth 
secretary general, heads the Commonwealth Secretariat. The secretary general 
can represent the organization at international forums and provide good offices. 
Traditionally, commentators on international affairs have paid little attention to 
international bureaucracies. This comparative disregard has lessened over recent 
years, as scholars have become more interested in autonomy, power, dysfunction 
and change in these bureaucracies.18 In contrast to their counterparts in the EU or 
the UN, the Commonwealth civil servants are highly dependent on what the first 
Commonwealth decides. Central to ComSec here is the Executive Committee, 
which meets every three months, makes policy recommendations, and oversees 
budgets and audit functions. It consists of 16 member state representatives: eight 
from the largest funders and eight from other countries selected on a regional 
non-permanent basis. Compared to similar bodies in many other international 
organizations, its size and budget are very small. With under 300 staff, it is compa-
rable in size to the UK Office of Rail Regulation, Education Scotland or the 
UN canteen in New York.19 A large proportion of its staff deals primarily with 
support activities such as human resources, communications, public affairs and IT. 
Other divisions of the Commonwealth Secretariat do not really correspond with 
the programmes and activities of the organization; indeed, there appears to be an 
enormous mismatch—as for instance with human rights, an issue that receives a 
lot of media exposure and support from powerful member states, but is followed 
up by only a limited number of Commonwealth staff.20
16 Lorna Lloyd, Diplomacy with a difference: the Commonwealth Office of High Commissioner, 1880–2006 (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
17 Shaw, Commonwealth, p. 41; Stuart Mole, ‘“Seminars for statesmen”: the evolution of the Commonwealth 
summit’, The Round Table 93: 376, 2004, pp. 533–46.
18 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the world: international organizations in global politics (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
19 Office for National Statistics, ‘Civil Service statistics 2012’, Statistical Bulletin, 24 Oct. 2012, table 11, pp. 32–3. 
According to these statistics, the FCO has a staff of 5,840, DFID 1,700. See http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
dcp171778_284549.pdf, accessed 14 July 2014. See also House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 
The role and future of the Commonwealth, examination of witness Kamalesh Sharma, Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth, 19 June 2012.
20 Report of the one-day conference held by the UK Institute of Commonwealth Studies, ‘The Commonwealth 
in crisis: is reform possible?’, 15 Nov. 2012, Deller Hall, University of London, p. 9, http://www.sirronald-
sanders.com/Docs/Commonwealth%20in%20Crisis%20FINAL%20REPORT.pdf, accessed 22 July 2014.
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Some did not consider the small size of the secretariat a problem. Sonny Ramphal, 
the second Secretary General, stated: ‘Overall, the Commonwealth Secretariat [is] 
a small organisation, and ought to remain so ... the Secretariat should be seen as 
developing not in quantitative but in qualitative terms; as functioning in the area 
of development and promotion of ideas, constituting something of a Common-
wealth think tank in a whole variety of areas; and trying to place on the ground ... 
machinery and agencies of practical cooperation.’21 Of the Commonwealth’s £48 
million budget in 2009/10, only 15 million went to the Commonwealth Secretariat 
for the day-to-day running of the organization. The remainder was allocated to 
two specialized funds: £30 to the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Coopera-
tion (CFTC), and £3 million to the Commonwealth Youth Program (CYP).22 
The amount of money allocated to the Commonwealth Secretariat is equal to 
the yearly salaries of a few of the top football players of a Premier League club. 
Australia, Britain, Canada (the so-called ABC countries) and New Zealand fund 
most of the budget. An international organization depending so heavily on a few 
member states for its finances is vulnerable to sudden shocks. The withdrawal of 
funds from UNESCO by the United States had devastating effects on its day-to-
day activities. Recently, Canada has announced it will review the level of its 
contributions to the Commonwealth.
The other two agencies are even smaller, with a combined staff of fewer than 
60 people promoting the soft power dimension of the Commonwealth through 
cosmopolitan programmes of education, development, literature and language, 
reinforcing the idea that the Commonwealth is a platform to promote English 
language, culture and education in the world. The Commonwealth Foundation is 
a modest office based at Marlborough House in London. It can be seen as a bridge 
builder with civil society (the ‘third Commonwealth’) through its Civil Society 
Advisory Committee. The Commonwealth of Learning is a Vancouver-based 
body promoting open and distance learning. One of the main projects funded by 
the Commonwealth of Learning is the Virtual University for Small States of the 
Commonwealth (VUSSC), covering 32 small Commonwealth states.
The limited number of countries funding the Commonwealth clearly indicates 
its vulnerability. Tensions between the first and second Commonwealth affect the 
exercise of its core functions. A perfect example is provided by the position of the 
chairperson-in-office, a fairly new position introduced in 1999. It is held by the 
organizing head of state immediately after the CHOGM until the next meeting 
two years later. So, although the tension surrounding the Colombo CHOGM 
may have eased somewhat, it is far from gone, and has implications far beyond 
the public relations disaster of the meeting itself. For not only has the Sri Lankan 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa taken over from Australian PM Tony Abbott as 
chairperson, he has also become an ex officio member of the CMAG, a move that 
21 Statement by HE Shridath Ramphal to Commonwealth Permanent Representatives, United Nations, New 
York, 18 Oct. 1976, cited in Stuart Mole, ‘From Smith to Sharma: role of the Secretary General’, in Mayall, 
ed., The contemporary Commonwealth, p. 61.
22 Commonwealth Secretariat, 60 ways the Commonwealth makes a difference (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2009), http://secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/files/215762/FileName/60Ways.pdf, accessed 22 July 2014.
Francis Baert and Timothy M. Shaw
1150
International Affairs 90: 5, 2014
Copyright © 2014 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2014 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
will silence the human rights monitoring group for the coming two years. The 
chairperson is an ill-defined position with the potential to become a diplomatic 
embarrassment. The Commonwealth could have saved itself further embarrass-
ment if it had adopted the proposal in the EPG report to abolish this function.
Finally, the ‘third Commonwealth’ (the ‘people’s Commonwealth’) is an inter-
esting and distinctive feature of the ‘family’. No fewer than 90 civil society organi-
zations have close contacts with the Commonwealth Secretariat. These include 
prestigious institutions such as the Association of Commonwealth Universities, 
the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the Commonwealth Lawyers 
Association, the Commonwealth Press Union and the Commonwealth Games 
Federation (which organizes the summer games of over 70 countries every four 
years, alternating with the Olympics: by far one of the most popular features of 
the Commonwealth) and the growing number of NGOs and civil society groups 
such as the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI). The Common-
wealth Business Council (CBC) brings together established and emerging market 
multinational corporations to advance public–private partnerships, including 
those with headquarters in the Commonwealth BRICS, India and South Africa 
(for example, ABSA, De Beers, DStv, Infosys, Nando’s, Reliance, Shoprite, Tata) 
and those that largely operate in the Commonwealth BRICS but have formal 
headquarters in Europe (Anglo American, ArcelorMittal) or the United States 
(SABMiller).
Timothy M. Shaw refers to Commonwealth(s) in his writings in order to 
highlight the extended family dimension.23 Some of the larger of these organi-
zations preceded the formal establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
Commonwealth of Learning or Commonwealth Foundation, but it was only in 
1997 that CHOGM in Edinburgh formally recognized the extended Common-
wealth family by arranging a platform for regular institutionalized interactions 
between the Commonwealth Secretariat and business, civil society and youth 
groups. Many activities of the Business, Human Rights, People’s and Youth 
Forums take place in the margins of the CHOGM and other ministerial confer-
ences. Although this bottom-up civil society aspect of the Commonwealth may 
be applauded, here too the picture is not an entirely positive one. Many of these 
organizations do not need the official and bureaucratic Commonwealth to survive, 
and if the Commonwealth were to fail, many of them could just rename themselves 
and continue with their daily activities. Other organizations more closely associ-
ated with the first and second Commonwealths suffer problems associated with 
ageing (and largely male) memberships and financial setbacks.
In outlining these three Commonwealths, we have focused on the ‘formal’ 
Commonwealth institutions; the picture can be further expanded by taking 
into consideration an ‘informal’ Commonwealth, manifested in the Anglophone 
world through cultural phenomena such as Bollywood in India and Nollywood 
in Nigeria and sports such as cricket and rugby. Timothy M. Shaw calls this the 
‘Commonwealth Plus’, to capture what he sees as commonalities across different 
23 Shaw, Commonwealth. 
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states and societies of the Commonwealth, including the many diasporas. These 
have been diffused via multiple ‘extra-official’ or non-institutional features or 
networks of the Commonwealth such as culture, language and literature, media 
and sports, which enable the Secretariat and Foundation, Games and professional 
associations to claim a degree of influence.24 The British Council, the BBC and 
other media organizations, the English-Speaking Union, Lonely Planet, Oxfam, 
Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) and other such bodies reinforce the Anglo-
phone world which some have dubbed the ‘Anglosphere’. This Commonwealth 
Plus very much reflects the changing character of Britain, the Commonwealth 
and the world.
Notwithstanding the existence of this wide variety of bodies and organiza-
tions, some of them in a precarious state, at the Colombo CHOGM a new episode 
of institution-building was announced. A Commonwealth Youth Council is to 
be based in Sri Lanka with funding from Pakistan; Mauritius proposed the estab-
lishment of a Climate Finance Skills Hub, and Malta a Small States Centre of 
Excellence. It was also decided at Colombo that a study on the easing of the cross-
border movement of Commonwealth citizens engaged in bona fide travel would 
be commissioned, and an open-ended High-Level Working Group of Heads 
would prepare a Commonwealth response to the post-2015 development agenda.
Who is in charge? Internal challenges and competition
Since the Commonwealth has no formal constitution, it is guided by a series of 
agreements and precedents embodying its principles and aims, generally known as 
declarations or statements, and issued by the CHOGM. Together, these constitute 
a foundation of Commonwealth values and a history of concern in global affairs. 
The first fundamental statement of core beliefs is the Declaration of Common-
wealth Principles, which was issued at the 1971 summit in Singapore. The Decla-
ration defines the voluntary character and consensual working methods of the 
Commonwealth, specifying the goals and objectives of the association. It was 
followed by many other initiatives: the Langkawi Declaration on the Environ-
ment (1989), the Harare Commonwealth Declaration (1991), the Millbrook Action 
Programme (1995), the Latimer House Principles (2004), the Trinidad and Tobago 
Affirmation of Commonwealth Values and Principles (2009) and the Perth Decla-
ration on Food Security Principles (2011), to name a few. In Colombo, this list 
was extended with three new statements: the Colombo Declaration on Sustain-
able, Inclusive and Equitable Development, the Kotte Statement on International 
Trade and Investment, and the Magampura Declaration of Commitment to 
Young People. This long list immediately shows the diverse set of topics covered 
by the Commonwealth. The analysis of the tripartite structure of the formal 
Commonwealth set out above has already indicated the wide variety of poten-
tial internal challenges and external influences with which it has to cope; in this 
section, we take a closer look at four overlapping internal issues which undermine 
24 Shaw, Commonwealth, p. 16.
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the Commonwealth’s claim to relevance and influence. All must be taken into 
consideration if successful reform is to be achieved.
Mandate
As noted above, the Commonwealth is guided by a series of declarations and state-
ments that were eventually codified in 2013 by the adoption of the non-binding 
Commonwealth Charter. For many (especially media organizations and policy-
makers in the West), the yardstick by which the success or failure of the Common-
wealth is evaluated is its promotion of values. More specifically, this means its 
ability to promote human rights and democracy in its member states.25 Recent 
instances have involved Fiji, the Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. 
From the perspective of the first Commonwealth, this is definitely the case. 
However, discussions on this matter are highly sensitive and run the risk of 
becoming ideological, or even merely philosophical, debates. The current reshuf-
fling of power consequent on the rise of the BRICS has highlighted these debates.26 
Is the Commonwealth a force for good in the world? If so, is it better to exclude 
countries such as Sri Lanka? What about Gambia, now that it has unexpectedly 
left the Commonwealth, apparently without any forewarning or rationale? From 
the perspective of the second Commonwealth, human rights are less relevant than 
the rhetoric might suggest; as indicated, there is only a small human rights unit 
dealing with these issues on a daily basis. Economic and political relations among 
the member states are the focal issues; within these areas, development and youth 
are seen as particularly important, with dedicated funds allocated to them. 
The wide variety of actors within the third Commonwealth represents a 
diversity of groups defined by religion, approach and many other factors. They 
symbolize the potential soft power role of the Commonwealth. It could be argued 
that overall the mandate of the Commonwealth is one of stimulating ‘democracy, 
development and diversity’ in the world: the three Ds. How these ideals may be 
put into practice is another discussion, for which only limited space is available 
here. With regard to democracy and human rights, the Commonwealth has been 
rather reluctant to act in the last decade; as the UK House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee has pointed out: ‘The moral authority of the Commonwealth 
has too often been undermined by the repressive actions of member governments. 
We were disturbed to note the ineffectiveness of the mechanisms for upholding 
the Commonwealth’s values’.27 A clear credibility problem also attaches to devel-
opment. In 2011 a review of the Department for International Development 
(DFID) found that the Commonwealth did not live up to international standards 
and was offering poor value for money. This finding was backed by DFID’s 
counterparts in Australia and Canada.28 With regard to diversity, there is much 
25 James Mayall, ‘Democratizing the Commonwealth’, International Affairs 74: 2, 1998, pp. 379–92.
26 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be powers?’, International 
Affairs 82: 1, 2006, pp. 1–19.
27 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The role and future of the Commonwealth, p. 3.
28 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The role and future of the Commonwealth, p. 35.
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still to be done. In the words of former Secretary General Anyaoku: ‘The world 
remains crippled by conflict and, in a globalised age, the fault lines are increas-
ingly within states and communities rather than between nations. The terrors of 
the new age have released the curse of “otherness”; and difference is not a cause 
of curiosity and celebration but suspicion and fear.’29 An important step has been 
taken by the Commonwealth with the thoughtful 2007 report Civil paths to peace, 
the outcome of the Commonwealth Commission on Respect and Understanding 
chaired by Amartya Sen.30 Although very timely, this report has not resulted in 
concrete policies. This confirms the general observation that first and foremost 
the Commonwealth needs to reflect on what it can do, and where it can make a 
difference. As Sir Ronald Sanders recently stated: ‘The Secretariat should retire 
(a) work that enjoyed no specific Commonwealth advantage, (b) work that could 
be better done by organisations with far greater resources; and (c) work that had 
demonstrated no particular impact.’31
The British imperial past and current ‘dominance’
For some analysts, the Commonwealth is not an organization of equals. Some 
British influence, if not domination or hegemony, might be presumed. Based 
in London, the Commonwealth is often seen locally as a vehicle for wider UK 
foreign policy strategy. In addition, its official head has always been the British 
monarch—since 1952, Queen Elizabeth II, who celebrated her diamond jubilee in 
2012. The fact that the Commonwealth is based in London generates scepticism, 
even suspicion. Its location, especially the imperial aura of Marlborough House, 
owned by the British royal family, continues to indicate the colonial genesis, if 
not inheritance, of the organization. On the other hand, we would argue that it 
is not the organization’s location in the UK that is notable so much as its situation 
in cosmopolitan London, among that city’s many diasporas. London represents 
not only the past and present of the Commonwealth but also its multicultural, 
multiracial and postcolonial future.32 Networks of global cities are increas-
ingly studied for their importance in global governance. Many of the non-state 
networks animated or orchestrated by the ‘Commonwealth of the people’ meet 
in London. And the city itself is one of the foremost in a growing network of 
mega-cities. 
The UK has always felt reluctant to take the lead in the Commonwealth, but 
as its biggest donor it surely holds a special place. Krishnan Srinivasan, former 
Commonwealth Deputy Secretary General, argued for a more prominent role for 
Britain. The main message of his 2005 book was a plea for British leadership and 
prominence in the ‘British Commonwealth’.33 This suggestion was met by separate 
29 Emeka Anyaoku, ‘Through the past, glimpses of the future’, in Commonwealth yearbook (London: Common-
wealth Secretariat, 2009), cited in Mole, ‘From Smith to Sharma’, p. 63.
30 Commonwealth Secretariat, Civil paths to peace: report of Commonwealth Commission on Respect and Understanding 
(London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007).
31 ‘The Commonwealth in crisis: is reform possible?’, p. 19.
32 John McLeod, Postcolonial London: rewriting the metropolis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004).
33 Krishnan Srinivasan, The rise, decline and future of the British Commonwealth (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005). 
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reviews from five prominent Commonwealth scholars, all of whom reacted 
with surprise to the author’s main message.34 The Commonwealth is rooted in 
British history and dominance but has long since grown beyond this. The official 
(symbolic) leadership issue is becoming acute as the Queen—the midwife of the 
Commonwealth in its formative period of decolonization—approaches 90 years 
of age, and it is compounded by the less attractive global image, and less relevant 
connections to the Commonwealth, of her successor, Prince Charles. The Queen 
is still formal Head of State of 16 of the Commonwealth members.35 However, in 
a club of over 50 independent states, the majority of whose members are republics, 
this inheritance or relic of the past raises many questions.36 
Britain’s reluctance to become more deeply involved is not helped by the fact 
that it does not now need the Commonwealth to promote the English language 
abroad. Globalization did that, thanks to US hegemony. Even in France, universi-
ties increasingly provide classes in English. As David Graddol notes in a British 
Council report, the reason for ‘the current enthusiasm for English in the world 
is closely tied to the complex processes of globalization ...  the future of English 
has become more closely tied to the future of globalization itself ’ as the global 
lingua franca.37 The Commonwealth Plus, including Bollywood and Nollywood, 
promulgates its own versions of English.
Thought leadership
What will be the future of the Commonwealth when Queen Elizabeth II is no 
longer on the throne? Is she, as the Telegraph’s Peter Oborne has stated, the only 
one who understands the true value of the Commonwealth?38 In a broader context, 
who leads the Commonwealth? The UK cannot be considered the hegemon, and 
few other states seem willing to take the lead. Within Whitehall the Common-
wealth is loved by few.39 For the current government, it is largely a tool for keep-
ing Tory Eurosceptics diverted. Although there are unique opportunities for other 
countries such as India and South Africa to take up a more prominent role, they 
34 W. David McIntyre, Stuart Mole, Lucian M. Ashworth, Timothy M. Shaw and Alex May, ‘Whose Common-
wealth? Responses to Krishnan Srinivasan’s The rise, decline and future of the British Commonwealth’, The Round 
Table 96: 388, 2006, pp. 57–70.
35 For the list of Commonwealth realms, see note 15 above. Also to be taken into account are the 14 British 
overseas territories regulated by the British Overseas Territories Act 2002: Sovereign Bay areas of Akrotiri 
and Dhekelia, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, the Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno 
Islands, St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Turks 
and Caicos Islands. And New Zealand’s responsibilities include Tokelau, the Cook Islands and Niue.
36 Philip Murphy and Daisy Cooper, Queen Elizabeth II should be the final head of the Commonwealth, ‘Opinions’ 
(London: Commonwealth Advisory Bureau, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 
July 2012).
37 David Graddol, English next (London: British Council, 2006), p. 13. See also Timothy M. Shaw, ‘Towards “new 
multilateralisms”? Globalization, anti-globalization and the Commonwealth’, Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics 41: 3, 2003, pp. 1–12.
38 Peter Oborne, ‘Only the Queen understands the true value of the Commonwealth’, Telegraph, 27 Dec. 2013. 
See also on this point Philip Murphy, Monarchy and the end of empire: the House of Windsor, the British government, 
and the postwar Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
39 For an exception, see David Howell, Old links and new ties: power and persuasion in an age of networks (London: 
I. B. Tauris, 2014).
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show great reluctance to do so. Within the Secretariat, the new buzzword is 
‘thought leadership’, though it is unclear what the current Secretary General, a 
distinguished career diplomat, means by this. In the Sri Lankan controversy, he just 
shuffled off the responsibility for hosting the meeting in Colombo to the member 
states in a disastrous Channel 4 interview. This may have been technically correct, 
but the position of secretary general should be more than a nice retirement plan. 
During the last 20 years, secretaries general have shied away from any bold state-
ments or concrete reform proposals, in contrast to their more ‘dirigiste’ predeces-
sor, Sonny Ramphal.40 This reduces the idea of ‘thought leadership’ to cheap 
business talk with little content. Or, as David Brooks fantastically observed in his 
satirical New York Times column: ‘The Thought Leader is sort of a highflying, 
good-doing yacht-to-yacht concept peddler. . . .  He spends spring break unicycling 
across Thailand while reading to lepers.’41
Membership
Some members and leaders are more active than others. It is often said that the 
Commonwealth mainly serves the goals of the SIDS. However, they account for 
only a small proportion of its population. There are often references in official 
documents to the ‘Commonwealth of the people’, which should not be confused 
with the ‘people’s Commonwealth’. If one takes this slogan at face value, then India 
and its people represent more than 50 per cent of the membership’s population, 
and should therefore be the nucleus of Commonwealth activities.42 However, 
given India’s ambiguous relationship with the Commonwealth, the organization 
is more likely to prefer to privilege other large, but more interested, players such 
as Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa, or even Bangladesh, Malaysia and Singa-
pore. The apparent lack of interest of the global South also contrasts with the 
unclear orientation of established, traditional players like the ABC countries. In 
this sense, a unique opportunity for countries like India or South Africa to play a 
more leading role in international affairs is missed.
Often the role of Africa is sadly overlooked. Yet, with 18 members, it is by far 
the most important region within the Commonwealth, and many of the organi-
zation’s policies directly focus on Africa. As is so often the case in international 
organizations, Africa is on many occasions the core focus of attention, but the 
African voice or perspective is often missing. As Sophie Harman and William 
Brown have indicated with regard to academic debates: ‘Africa is at the core of 
empirical understandings of international relations but often at the periphery of 
theoretical insights.’43 
40 Stephen Chan, ‘An ornithology of secretaries-general: the Commonwealth and its leadership’, The Round 
Table 94: 380, 2005, pp. 325–37.
41 David Brooks, ‘The thought leader’, New York Times, 16 Dec. 2013.
42 Commonwealth Secretariat, A Commonwealth of the people.
43 Sophie Harman and William Brown, ‘In from the margin? The changing character of Africa in International 
Relations’, International Affairs 89: 1, 2013, p. 87.
Francis Baert and Timothy M. Shaw
1156
International Affairs 90: 5, 2014
Copyright © 2014 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2014 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
How relevant is the Commonwealth to global governance in the twenty-
first century? External challenges and fragmentation
Whereas the previous section of this article focused on internal matters and 
their challenges, this section looks at the complex and very competitive external 
environment in which the Commonwealth operates. This environment is increas-
ingly characterized by heterogeneous forms of ‘global governance’, involving 
a wide variety of goals, actors and structures. Global issues and responses are 
afflicted by fragmentation, duplication and many other ‘pathologies’. The fact 
that the Commonwealth touches on many different topics makes it a participant, 
whether explicit or implicit, in a growing network of hypercomplexity. Within 
such dense networks, four sets of increasingly important groups of actors can be 
identified as potential partners or, indeed rivals: other international organizations, 
other ‘Commonwealths’, regional organizations and global policy networks.
Other international organizations
As a small organization, the Commonwealth Secretariat has sought from the very 
beginning to establish meaningful interactions with other international organiza-
tions. With regard to the UN, the Commonwealth is a firm promoter of UN 
norms in fields such as human rights, climate change, and peace and security, 
many of which it has endorsed in its principles and declarations. All Common-
wealth members also belong to the UN, and the Secretariat has observer status 
at the UN General Assembly. Since 1983, the Commonwealth has funded and 
administered a Joint Office for Commonwealth Permanent Missions to the 
United Nations for eleven small Commonwealth member states. A similar initia-
tive was taken in 2011 for Geneva. Even in a field where one might least expect 
the Commonwealth to act, that of peace and security, it has been supportive of 
UN actions. The Commonwealth has participated in every high-level meeting 
between the UN secretary general and the heads of regional and other intergov-
ernmental organizations since their inception in 1994.44 The Commonwealth’s 
good offices have been used in conflicts in Swaziland, Tonga, Guyana, Fiji and the 
Maldives, places distant from and, not surprisingly, of little geopolitical interest 
to most Great Powers in the world. In respect of SIDS, the Commonwealth is 
also successfully collaborating with the World Bank, having set up a joint task 
force on small states. The collaboration between different international organi-
zations is an interesting way to deal with fragmentation in global governance. 
The commonwealths have to network to survive: which of them has the greatest 
networking potential?
44 UNU-CRIS, Capacity survey: regional and other intergovernmental organizations in the maintenance of peace and secu-
rity (Bruges: UNU-CRIS, 2008), http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/user_upload/capacity_survey.pdf, 
accessed 14 July 2014; Philippe de Lombaerde, Francis Baert and Tania Felicio, eds, The United Nations and the 
regions: Third World report on regional integration (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012).
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Other commonwealths
The Commonwealth has to take into account other post-colonial ‘common-
wealths’, namely its Lusophone, Spanish and French equivalents. Innovation 
and competition between commonwealths has led to their evolution, even their 
creation in the case of the Lusophone commonwealth, established when Mozam-
bique was admitted to the anglophone Commonwealth on the return to the fold 
of South Africa under Nelson Mandela in the mid-1990s. The relationship with 
the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) merits particular atten-
tion.45 Rwanda left the OIF before being admitted to the anglophone Common-
wealth at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. However, in the 
last decade, the Commonwealth and OIF have embarked on extensive collabora-
tion. For several years now, they have organized joint meetings in the margins of 
the G20. Another very important example is the Hubs and Spokes programme, 
whereby they collaborate with the EU and the ACP (African, Caribbean and 
Pacific states) in order to provide capacity and training for ACP countries in inter-
national trade negotiations. So, somewhat ironically, one of the more successful 
Commonwealth projects is supported by EU funds.
Regional organizations
Closely related to the rise of global international organizations is the proliferation 
of regional organizations. The Commonwealth faces increasing competition from 
these organizations. Yet care needs to be taken in making this point, for regional 
cooperation varies from region to region. Regional organizations in Africa, the 
Caribbean and Europe are particularly well coordinated and therefore do present 
a challenge to the Commonwealth. Clearly, in the case of Cyprus, Malta and the 
UK, the EU is the more important organization. The continuous crisis about the 
UK’s membership in and attitudes towards the EU occasionally generates discus-
sions about the UK leaving the EU and taking a stronger position in the Common-
wealth, although the prospect is illusory. For the African countries, there are 
many regional organizations, including the African Union, the Southern African 
Development Community and the Economic Community of West African States, 
to name but a few. Countries such as South Africa and Nigeria prefer these forums 
over the Commonwealth. In the Caribbean, there are also other alternatives to 
the Commonwealth for collective action. However, we note that in this region 
the Commonwealth is often relied upon to amplify communications from other, 
less visible, regional entities. For the South and South-East Asian and South 
Pacific members there are fewer alternatives to the Commonwealth. Poorer Asian 
countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or the Pacific micro-states struggle to get 
their voices heard on the world stage. For them, the Commonwealth has clear 
45 There is an overlap in membership, with several countries belonging to both organizations: Cameroon, 
Canada, Cyprus, Dominica, Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda, St Lucia and Vanuatu. See Timothy M. Shaw, 
‘Comparative commonwealths: an overlooked feature of global governance’, Third World Quarterly 31: 2, 2010, 
pp. 333–46.
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benefits. But it is also through its Commonwealth membership that the Anglo-
phone world has shown an interest in Sri Lanka, otherwise nothing more than an 
exotic holiday destination in the Indian Ocean.
Global policy networks
Finally, the rise of social networks in our daily lives is also reflected in interna-
tional relations. We observe the growing relevance of global policy networks in 
the global governance of development, trade, health and the environment. The 
Commonwealth has been a network for many years: on one level it can be seen 
as a pioneer in this regard. But in a world where technological change has seen 
dramatic changes in the way both organizations and individuals conduct their 
affairs, it must be aware of the danger of falling behind bigger organizations and 
institutions. There is some concern that the Commonwealth is not ‘networking’ 
enough. 
Diane Stone identifies five kinds of global policy networks on the basis of 
their changing influence over different stages of policy-making. First, there are 
the transnational advocacy coalitions consisting of NGOs and activists. Second, 
there are business-related networks such as CBC. Third, there are transnational 
executive networks where government officials play a central role, such as the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA). Fourth, there is the group 
of global public policy networks to which the Global Water Partnership, for 
instance, belongs. Finally, there are knowledge networks and epistemic commu-
nities which present scholarly argumentation and scientific justification for 
evidence-based policy formulation.46 Functions of global policy networks can be 
related to partici pation, on the one hand, or to global governance, on the other. 
Networks may or may not include non-state actors, civil society and business 
enterprises. From the governance aspect, networks are involved in different stages 
of the policy process. They set global agendas, develop standards or coordinate 
knowledge dissemination.
The Commonwealth Secretariat may influence policy but is not a policy-maker. 
This point relates to recent concern about the Commonwealth’s visibility. It is 
not so much a source of new ideas as an intermediate diffuser of ideas that origi-
nate somewhere else, for example in the UN or the World Bank. In this regard, 
more active involvement in current global policy networks would be advisable. 
Perhaps it would even be worth initiating new networks on core Commonwealth 
concerns. This would require a renewed activism from the secretary general more 
in the spirit of Sonny Ramphal, who can be seen as a global citizen, active in 
idea diffusion through his participation in a series of blue-ribbon global commis-
sions when the ‘Third World’ was a central feature of global governance, and in 
his acting as co-chair of the post-Cold War Commission on Global Governance, 
leading to its 1995 report Our global neighbourhood.
46 Diane Stone, ‘Global public policy, transnational policy communities, and their networks’, Policy Studies Jour-
nal 36: 1, 2008, pp. 19–38.
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Conclusion: Commonwealth futures post-2015
If Susan Strange is right and international organizations never seem to die, we 
should at least make better use of them. This article has revolved around the 
central question of whether successful Commonwealth reform is possible. A new 
round of lofty reform proposals will not change much. Concrete action plans are 
necessary. The passage of the Commonwealth Secretariat’s half-century should be 
used to reflect on the organization’s future, not to celebrate its past. It can allow 
the Commonwealth to take advantage of its strengths—informality, hybridity 
and its network character—to advance global governance by advancing relevant 
hybrid coalitions. 
As the global South rises and other political economies in the North Atlantic 
and Pacific stabilize, so the Commonwealth could ride the wave of rebalancing, 
addressing itself to the many and disparate issues of concern to its members: culture, 
democracy, economics, ecology, education, health, the particular needs of islands 
and so on. The rise of the global South, which seems to us a more significant trend 
than the celebrated rising economic potentialities of the BRICS, challenges the 
orthodox understanding of global governance and will put more emphasis on the 
advancement of relevant hybrid coalitions of actors. The Commonwealth was a 
social network long before the concept had true meaning; it is now time for the 
Commonwealth to network more. It should find the right partners within the 
public and private sector to advance human development. The Secretariat should 
again become a global player capable of punching above its weight. This can only 
be done with clear and dynamic leadership. 
In 2015, member states can elect a new secretary general. They should seek 
a dynamic and visionary candidate who can inspire people and knows how to 
deal with the media. But, more importantly, it should be a man or woman who 
reasserts the Secretariat as a useful arena of creation and reflection. Its staffing 
and budget will remain very limited, so it will need a clear-cut programme of 
action executed by a dynamic team to save it from irrelevance. Strengthening the 
human rights unit would be a start. Similarly, concrete deeds with regard to the 
environment, food and climate change in the SIDS spirit that comfortably fits the 
Commonwealth agenda would strongly mark new ways for the Commonwealth 
to be a diffuser, not merely a receiver, of ideas.
If member states fail to make these choices, they will be giving the Common-
wealth the kiss of death. We have shown that owing to its precarious nature and 
informal working methods, the Commonwealth is truly an organization driven 
by its member states. This is not necessarily a bad thing. We are living in a time of 
enormous opportunities for dynamic states. Classical middle powers like Australia 
and Canada can play an increasingly prominent role in overcoming North–
South divides. But to an even greater extent, African and Asian states could find 
in the Commonwealth a vehicle through which to play a truly global role and 
enrich discussions with new insights. The Commonwealth is not, and should 
not be, a colonial white men’s club. Indeed, the ABC countries are increasingly 
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multicultural and multiracial. We are in dire need of new recipes for global 
governance in order to advance novel forms of international relations, the basis 
for post-2015 contributions to global governance.47 The year 2015 should be the 
year in which the Commonwealth finds a new tune. And like the famous jazz 
standard—that unique wider Atlantic mélange of styles and influences—‘It don’t 
mean a thing, if it ain’t got that swing.’
47 Timothy M. Shaw and Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Commonwealth perspectives on International Relations’, Inter-
national Affairs 85: 5, Sept. 2010, pp. 1149–65.
